source of the right sort of alienation -so that I could bring the thing back and reexperience what was going on in the text, as someone sometimes surprised, sometimes delighted, sometimes someone much less than delighted.
The other thing is, it [was] my last term teaching and, as a certain sort of way of saying goodbye to the official part of teaching, it seemed to me a way to go back all over everything in my life, in my publishing life, since i%e Claim of Reason reaches deeply into my Ph.D. thesis and is still a part of the latest things that I do. So, if there were one text of mine that, in winding things down, I would go to, that would be it.
What I am not answering is why I felt ready to do it, even felt that it might be a creative thing to do, and the last chance to do something in the classroom, one that I am used to and have made my home, my last chance to do that and listen to that book through those sensibilities. I didn't want to miss that experience. I hope, I feel, that I am profiting from doing this. Cavell: I didn't respond to that first part of your first question. I don't find that but one specifically, a very late piece, just written two or three years ago, the first time that I have tried writing on Wittgenstein in a systematic way. In this piece of mine, I relate it directly to German romanticism. But that partly tells the tale I have about this. I don't feel compelled to go back or on with Wittgenstein, but when a small piece of lightning strikes, I welcome it and I am glad to follow where it leads. Or when someone pushes me to d o it, I am happy to. O r when someone tells me that Wittgenstein is a neo-pragmatist, or words to that effect, I am glad, as I just did in a little paper that I gave at a pragmatist conference, [to] raise the question about that. I don't regard myself as a Wittgenstein scholar, and I don't continue to be fascinated by what he can d o philosophically past the point that that life-changing fascination came over me with respect to the Investigations. Almost everything that has been pushed at me has seemed to me to be in the Investigations.
HRP: Your encounter with
That won't be true of the mathematics, but I say a couple of things about My interest in Shakespeare, for example, is exploding so fast again and in so many regions, some of which will come back to Wittgenstein. Since I have time, I am letting that take me that way. The odd connection with Wittgenstein is punctuated later. There is a piece of mine, a rather late piece, on Wittgenstein as a philosopher of culture that I was extremely happy to be writing. It was an assignment that I liked, given by some Wittgensteinians who had asked if I had thought about it; and I hadn't, and I wanted to. And when the idea dawned on me of how to go about thinking about h s writing in terms of comparing him to writings, especially of Schlegel (for what reason that became a possibility I won't go into) I profited fiom it. But if it's without passion, it's not going t o call upon me just out of completeness to d o it. I had a full say, I feel, about the Investigations, and I want other people tell me whether I need to say more. 
HRP:

wishes-He says in
But, it's going to be hard for me to much intcrsome obvious ways. ested in it, if the advance doesn't come in that sort of way. Now I say this also in ignorance of a great deal of work that has been done. At my age you have to be specific with me, somebody has got to put a theological reading of Wittgenstein in my hands and say, "Here, you haven't thought of that, have you?" and then I will gladly look at it. Cavell: Well, the idea of Emersonian Perfectionism is certainly one for me that invokes philosophy, not simply in connection with life -as it sometimes called for by people exasperated with academic philosophy, they want it to have some bearing, as they put it, on the way we live -but even more startling, philosophy itself as a way of life. And both those relations of philosophy to the way one lives are in Emerson and, in that way, he picks up a very large, long, fascinating, honorable tradition of philosophical thinking. It is in itself no more religious than it is -did you offer the possibility of a substitute for religion? -I don't know that I'd say quite a substitute for religion, but it becomes a part of philosophy's quarrel with religion, a quarrel or competition with religion in forming some basis for human existence. Emerson, after all, left the pulpit when he was in his early thirties. And there the way he speaks of not believing in the Last Supper, the way he later denies the importance of the person of Jesus, and nevertheless, despite all, recommends a form of life that clearly has religious undertones, to say the least, in it, is, was, a fascination for me. But this is a development of my general interest in Emerson, when I couldn't leave it alone, and it was not the first thing that interested me.
What occurred to me about Emerson, when I asked, kept pressing upon myself the question, "What is attracting me over and over? Every time I finish one piece, something else grabs me, and I have to keep going back to it -why?" The fact that it seemed to underlie the writing of both Wittgenstein and Heidegger I found extraordinary -why extraordinary? No doubt due t o my interest in themthat this aspect of Emerson occurred t o me. But that Emerson allows me to see a connection that deep in Wittgenstein and Heidegger, to call Being and Time and the Investigations -let's just stay ~l t h those two -perfectionist works says, first of all, something I have already said I think significant about their connection with one another. And "significant" is based on each text saying something about each of them as authors, each of them placing a certain kind of demand on their readers that most philosophical texts don't place. Is that connection one that I also believe to have religious aspects, undertones, undersongs, overtones to it? Whether I said yes or no to that, I would say yes to something as explaining something that each Heidegger and Wittgenstein have to claim or have to deny about their work.
Wittgenstein claims about his work that it has certain religious aspirations. This was reported by young friends and pupils -his young friends were pupils. You could also take it, and as one of my later essays does, to account specifically for what everybody recognizes to be the fervor of the writing in the Investigations. I raise the question whether that fervor is religious or whether it can be understood morally. But in the case of perfectionist \vriting, that is exactly a difference that is not only hard to dra~v, but that you are almost dared to try to draw. It doesn't exactly require transcendent beliefs, but it certainly does require coniniitnients about a responsiveness to one's own existence that most modern philosopl~!~ texts, anyray, don't, unless you find a way that they do, ~vhich I am not at all averse to. To find, for example, in the Critique of Pure Reaso?~ as deep a therapeutic impulse as in the Investz~ations wouldn't hurt my feelings.
Heidegger, far from encouraging people to think of his \vork in this way, over and over in Being and Time denies that it is an ethical work. But he denies it so many times that you wonder ~vhy he has to go on denying this, and certainly he has to, from my point of vie\\, since over and over and over again, I kept feeling that that's what this is. I was finally able to put my finger on exactly what I thought that meant by the time I came to write the introduction to Conditions Handsome and Unhandsome, which is the place where I actually broached the issue of Emersonian Perfectionism. That that view of Emerson also explained to me something absolutely essential to what my dedication to writing about film was and is is a further contribution to what I think it means.
HRP: In your writing from the late 80s and early 90s, you take a serious interest in the Heidegger's thought. For many philosophers, Heidegger is a taboo figure due to his involvement with the Nazi party. I was wondering if you could tell us how you make sense of Heidegger's philosophy in light of his politics. This problem seems to beckon a larger question: how do you understand the relationship between a philosopher's life and his writing? Cavell: You're not expecting me to answer that whole question? Let me see if I can Heidegger, and that is that his Nietzsche lectures -which set the standard for Nietzsche interpretation, the work of Nietzsche interpretation to which every European philosopher who is interested in Nietzsche, and there are very few who are not, has had to respond -are lectures in which Heidegger recommends especially the young Nietzsche to our attention, and that young Nietzsche is the Nietzsche most nakedly indebted to the writings of Emerson.
So in 1936, Heidegger is giving endlessly influential interpretations of words, some of which, though he didn't know it, were Emerson's. That is something I'm stuck with, that I want to know about, as I want to know that Thoreau's Walden is interpreted by next to n o philosophical work more intimately than by certain texts of Heidegger. I cite the essay "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," but the other essays equally. Because it also a perfectionist work, more generally by Being and Time. But this connection with Thoreau, whom I regard as a philosophical genius and an American genius and one whom I have been inspired by and intend to become inspired again by -if I'm lucky -I can't avoid wanting to know how this happened.
So far as Heidegger's cursed fate is concerned and his damnation to have lived in a time when he was called forth by and associated in this tyrannical movement, it is blind not to see that philosophy is as such brought into question by Heidegger's fall and not just the peculiar exempted writing of this man. T o the extent to which you really have inherited Western philosophy -not the only way of inheriting philosophy but one genuine inheritance of a major part of Western philosophy -that philosophy, even when Heidegger regards it as an error and distracted, is playing a role in Heidegger's own thought and therefore in making this connection between philosophy and tyranny. 
absence. I don't quite believe
I don't quite believe that opera that opera was) in that sense, was, in that sense, made for philosophy, though it should fascinate philosophers madeforphilosophy) tho& it -should I say more than it does? It Shouldfascinate p~~~o s o p~e r s~ has fascinated philosophers of the magnitude of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard -that will do. But as you know, the fact of opera and the celebration of the human voice, so one could say, in the call of opera in the beginning of the time of the great tragedies of Shakespeare, a fact that I don't want to be lost on me, means that my own sense of philosophy, not only of celebrating, but of deploring the human voice in its efforts to rid it of its indecipherable moments, of its vagueness, of its evanescence, is something I have thought that the fact of opera might bear on. And having had one go at writing about it, I am still thinking about that. Something I haven't talked about, which I'm also very much thinking about, is, to adapt the first question you asked me, why opera so recently in my own life? And that I regard as a hopeful sign as it takes me back to my earliest interests in my life, which are interests in music. That music should be the art that, with major exceptions, should be least systematically treated by aestheticians, poses a challenge, poses a caution that I seem willing to take on.
I suppose I should say that the next thing that I am thinking about -I don't know why I am moved to say this -but, as you know, as a direct consequence of having given a course on opera, at least as ancient an interest as my interest in opera, probably more ancient, is my interest in American musical comedy. And so again I am led, taking steps across invisible stones in the water, to ask my questions about that, which is: what kind of talent, what kind of culture, expresses itself in that way? What kind of people have the talent to perform in it? Who writes it? It's not just popular art. It's not high art.
But it is a popular high art of a sort of high popularity that America is known for being able to create. These matters that were for years dismissable, like musical comedy and like jazz, dismissable as film used to be, are becoming less dismissable. T o ask me, therefore, what my interests in such things as jazz and musical comedy are is to ask me what my interest in America is, and that question is really all over mv work now, and I want it to be, and I want t o be able to say something more about it. What it is, though, is a confession that a part of my life-long commitment t o philosophy has been a life-long commitment to trying to find a way to write in a wav that I cared about, in a way that I seemed always to know about. T o use philosophy as a medium within which to write, especially to write work that would be acceptable and within earshot of English-speaking analy-tic philosophers seems a perverse and last place to look. For me, for various reasons, however, it has been inspiring. I hope it continues to be. Just to look at the American connection with opera, you may remember that I opened the opera course [at Harvard University] by asking how an American could hope to claim the depth of experience of opera, to write about it usefully, given the fact that America is not a culture that has produced opera until very recently on anything like the scale that matches the productions of the cultures of Italy, Germany, and France.
HRP:
You were here at Harvard in the 60s during the student movement. How did these times strike you? How do they strike you today? What has stayed with you from those years? Cavell: Surely the 60s were formative times for many people whose lives were centered in the university. It was the place from which to experience that event. But primarily it was the fact that virtually all of my young friends, virtually every student that I spoke to, whether they were in favor of student activity or not, were having their lives molded by this, and I experienced that and they experienced that. One could not, I felt, take the kind of interest, which is, after all, my business to have in what the young are thinking, without immersing myself in that experience, partly through identification but partly, explicitly, through a certain distancing.
Part of my role in those years was to maintain precisely a shared imagination with the young and also some way of presenting a possible distance from what they were feeling as a way of remembering something America was supposed to be doing and still could do, that they had not in their lifetimes experienced. I have this image of hurling myself into the middle of any conversation t o try t o split the difference between the two sides. Sometimes, I got rather bruised in the effort, sometimes it worked. But the sense of closeness to what was tearing apart these young people and the pain it cost me that they did not know an America that I thought I knew and that country was losing itself, was so painful that I found the something to d o about it, namely, that it was then that I rediscovered Emerson and Thoreau. I didn't know then that that was why I rediscovered them. I wasn't holding up Thoreau as the original flower child. It hadn't occurred to me exactly that Thoreau was some favorite of the generation of the sixties until much later. I discovered Thoreau explicitly because I assigned it to a group of visiting foreign scholars -European, Asian,
I have this image of hurling
American scholars -with whom I was doing a summer seminar on myselfinto the middle of any con--the classics of American thought. eign interest was almost as avid as that expressed by young American students interested in Emerson and T h o r e a~~. Everybody, it seemed, was trying to find an earlier or different American face from the one that it was showing the world in that moment, wanted to think better of America than, so to speak, America was asking it to think of itself in that awful period. And it was an unforgettable experience of the discovery of these marvels and the discovery of the follies that somehow the marvels were related to -was it the arrogance? Was it the ecstasy of innocence that felt it could d o anything? What was this? Living through it with the students I cared about permanently marked me, I wouldn't have it any other way. T o say more about it we'd have to go on in detail. A minimum answer, I expect, is that America is the place where philosophy and literature exist in a different relation to one another than they d o in any other culture that I know much about. Simply the fact that its great founding novels, as I've said before, picked up the metaphysical aspirations that were not being accounted for -anything like the European development of academic philosophy didn't exist here until a certain moment. That's a quasi-professional aspect of an answer. The other is -is it too late in the day to expect that there is a sense of social experimentation that is unlike the projects of other cultures? We're not still coming out of a colonial past. We're not coming out of a monarchical past. One feels that some possibility of experimenting with the manifestations of justice is still open to us. The fact that we have an outstanding racial problem is a task that, at my most romantic, I feel will be a mark of a great social achievement if it can be made more tractable, or continue to be made -I don't think that there have been no advances -more tractable than it has been. Somebody like me who comes from a New England family can hardly not be fascinated by a thing I've actually called a part of the American difference in philosophy as registered in the writing of Thoreau and Emerson. Namely, their willingness for departure, for what they call abandonment, for what they call onwardness, in short, for an embracing of the condition of immigrancy in their lives. It struck me in my earliest thinking about Emerson that he reversed the Heideggerian emphasis on learning to dwell where you are, reversed the emphasis and insisted on learning to leave where you are, which in part means willing it to allow it to change, willing to allow it to change you, and able to allow yourself to present yourself so that it changes. That's a remarkable aspiration for a culture and its leading thinkers to set for themselves. cp
